Explaining A Narrative in The Critical Philosophy of History by Akhyat, Arif
		
Jurnal Filsafat, ISSN: 0853-1870 (print); 2528-6811(online) 
Vol. 29, No. 2 (2019), p. 166-182, doi: 10.22146/jf.48937 
  
EXPLAINING A NARRATIVE IN THE CRITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 
 
Arif Akhyat 
Faculty of Cultural Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada 
Email: arief.fib@ugm.ac.id 
 
Abstract 
This paper explains the use of narrative in the study of history which 
has been understood merely as a way of telling what should have 
happened, not what really happened. Narrative as a philosophical 
thought will be able to reveal not only the factual side but also the 
actual side of history. As a philosophical thought, narrative should be 
able to provide a new understanding that narration is not just telling 
(history as a story), but also how can narration be used to explain the 
historical actuality? Through a new understanding of narrative, 
history actually as science becomes parallel to other sciences as 
philosophy. Historical narratives then present "stories" to "facts 
explained". Thus, history is present and humane because it is always 
actual. History as narrative, thus not only makes history a discourse 
with a dissertation of evidence but also history as a way of abstracting 
objects in factual thinking.  
Keyword: narrative, history, actuality, philosophy of history    
________________________________________________________ 
 
INTRODUCTION  
The controversy over the debate about the concept of history 
as a narrative has long been taking place. In the early twentieth 
century, the debate involved G.M. Traveleyan who was in polemic 
with J.B. Bury related to the issue of whether history was science 
(history as a science, no less and no more), or history was art (history 
as an art). Lucian Febvre and Marc Bloch, the founders of the Annals 
School, explained further that history is not just art and the past but 
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history as a narrative story and the other side as a history of events 
(a histoire evenementielle) (Callinicos, 1995; 44-53 ) 
 The debate has consequences in understanding the past 
and its interpretation. Ferdinand Braudel when describing The 
Mediterranean and The Mediterranean: World in the Age of Philip II 
made a postulation that says narrative is not a method, but of 
philosophical thought. This is because in its explanation, Braudel 
takes three main issues in Mediteranean history, namely events, 
politics and people. Braudel connects the three in the 
Mediterranean's long history by looking at what he called "destinies 
and general trends collectives." Basically Braudel's narrative has 
succeeded in explaining structural changes in rapid changes, 
dramatic events, dynamic transformations and revealing the 
complexity of the relationships between cause and effect and the 
diversity of trends in change. Braudel's narrative model is then 
famous for its structural history. Hobsbawm looked at Braudel's 
narrative models as nothing more than a "technical problem of 
presentation". This is based on the reality that in the complexity of 
the past there were not only empirical changes, such as events, 
politics and people, but all three had caused symbolic changes, 
rituals, beliefs and philosophy (Callinicos, 1995). The explanation of 
narrative by Ankersmit, a Dutch historical philosopher, is more 
clearly defined by narrative with chronology. Although it is 
admitted that narrative is not just past reports that are arranged 
chronologically and factually. However, for Ankersmit, chronology 
is a method that can explain narrative, narrating and story 
(Ankersmit, 1987; 222-223). 
 
NARRATIVE AS A NARRATION OF EXPRESSION  
 In his book Narrative and History, Munslow emphasized the 
importance of narration in historical reconstruction. Munslow 
reminded that in historical research, the task of historians is not just 
to construct (a construct), but at the same time to reconstruct (a 
reconstruct). This is where historical researchers have two tasks at 
once, how the past is constructed as the truth of the past and at the 
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same time gives an interpretation of the truth as a meaningful 
historical truth (Munslow, 2007: 1). This is where history is often 
faced with the problem of interpretation as a way to find meanings. 
By Munslow, the interpretation will actually bring down the 
historical writer in the puddle of subjectivity. Therefore, Munslow 
is more interested in process of representation than interpretation. 
Munslow further explained that representation or what Munslow 
used the term mode of representation is fundamental in the process 
of reconstructing the past. Mode of representation wants to answer 
what history is, why history is explained as what happened and not 
others, the most fundamental is what the meaning of all the 
explanations are? Munslow shows how history must be represented 
by paying attention to objective analysis so that the results can then 
be considered as narrative history. Narrative history is a 
construction process and at the same time reconstruction of 
historical events by looking at complexity as a reality (a coherent 
reality). Narrative history has the potential not only to formulate 
and explain the complexity of a past reality, but it is also required to 
carry out conceptualizations or theorizations. In historical 
methodology, the conceptualization and theorization process is part 
of the reconstruction process. The reconstruction process here is a 
process by which historical writers must be able to provide 
theoretical and conceptual conclusions from the results of 
constructing the past. Thus, narrative is no longer a method, per se, 
but is a result or a product of reconstruction that is given concepts 
and theories and even requires philosophical thinking (Munslow, 
2007; 2-3). 
 
 Following Munslow's thinking, historical narratives do not 
merely produce the construct (a construct) of the past, but 
reconstruct (a reconstruct) the past. Narrative history is a discourse 
on real events. As a discourse, past reality has a strong subjective 
effect because it is related to how the past discourse was told (issue 
of discourse or a narration of story). Then no less crucial is the 
problem associated with what Munslow called a category of 
	Arief Akhyat		169	
	 	
espionage (narrative of representation). Discourse on a reality, for 
Munslow is a semiotic representation that correlates with linguistic 
issues, its explanation and meaning in a particular context 
(correspondence theory). At this level, historians should have a 
hermeneutic ability to translate and transmit ideas in the text as a 
justified belief. The truth of hermeneutic discourse in the text will 
determine the truth of the story (story) to be narrated. However, the 
weakest point in any historical explanation actually occurs when 
transmitting ideas in the text. Linguistic limitations are often 
experienced by historians when looking for ideas in the text. If so, 
then ideas will not be captured correctly and result in a narrative 
error. 
 At the second level, the basic problem lies in the ability to 
tell a story with truth not only hermeneutics, but epistemological 
truths and descriptions. This is where historical stories differ from 
other literary or fictional works. Historical stories are based on 
linguistic and descriptive-epistemological abilities that are obtained 
by interpreting past realities. Literary stories or fictional works, 
based only on an imagination, although linguistic and descriptive 
abilities-epistemological cannot be denied. Fictional work is not 
needed to justify the story and narration of expression as history. 
The main issue that characterizes historical writing is how to tell the 
truth of a justified story. In this regard Munslow contributed very 
much to his thoughts. According to Munslow, when history writers 
will tell the truth of a story believed to be true of what he called 
fashion of representation, a history writer has actually told the story, 
explained the action, reconstructing the experiences, theorizing 
history. Quoting Donald N. MacRaild and Avram Taylor, Munslow 
asserts that historians at the time of their actual reconstruction while 
dialogue between theory and data, concepts with evidence and ends 
between themselves and the past. This is the concept of fashion of 
representation which is actually very much related to narration of 
expression. 
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DESCRIPTION OF NARRATION  
 In the review of the representation of Munslow's model 
above, there are limitations in how historical writers are often 
trapped in temptations of the past as if they were representations of 
the truth of the times. Representation as an illustration of different 
categories that are interrelated both relational and correlational. 
Causality law as believed by the positivistic group is often not 
proven in the process of representation. That is why epistemological 
modification is needed related to the existence of a justified story. 
Historical stories are "mosaics" which are limited to spatial and 
temporal ones that are filled with possibilities and imagination 
(possibilities and imaginaries). He is very flexible and freely 
interpreted, therefore the historian's courage is needed to 
reconstruct within rational limits. Where is historical rationality 
located? To overcome and formulate a history of cause of 
regularities and rational methods, a method that can provide clarity 
is needed. Descriptive methods, known in the writing of history at 
the initial level, are often understood as a historical writing that 
describes what it is, without giving a critical interpretation. In fact, 
in the context of critical history, descriptive methods are not merely 
connected between facts and other facts. Descriptive method 
requires conceptual and theoretical accuracy to determine 
categories that have factual relationships and correlations. 
Descriptive history is thus intended to describe as objectively as 
possible the events that are believed to have actually occurred. 
Objective clarity is precisely the character of descriptive history, but 
sharp criticism is always directed at this descriptive historical 
model. Descriptive history is too rigid, straight and dry and does 
not involve cognitive and emotional aspects. Often the history of 
descriptive is accused of being a non-perspective history. 
 Different things in narrative history, narrative history has 
more complex consequences. Narrative as a result of construction 
and historical reconstruction has two contents, namely what is told 
(story) and discourse (discourse) (Munslow, 2007; 20-21). Story 
becomes an object whose truth is believed to be explained based on 
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perspective, narration, approach or theory, and methodology. This 
makes the story no longer an irregular and meaningless story. The 
story is then narrated based on the method, methodology and 
theory used. The story that is believed to be true is constructed and 
reconstructed based on certain methods, theories and 
methodologies which are then called Narratives or in historical 
studies often called narrative history. By paying attention to how 
narrative history is constructed and reconstructed, narrative history 
then becomes the result of past studies which are considered 
historical truths. This does not mean that the study of narrative 
history has no problem with subjectivity. Narrative history as the 
Ankersmit critique, still seems very positive. Narrative history 
emphasizes diachronic sides more than synchronous aspects. When 
using the term Weberian, the study of narrative history must 
proceed with the process of "objectivity of spirit" (Roth, 1976), 
namely how the meanings and meanings in all forms of social 
phenomena are not only interpreted in the subject's scope, but must 
also be present in the object. This approach is often termed an 
approach to idealism in history. The method used is to understand 
each object both its structure and personality (grasp of each object's 
structure and individuality), then interpreted (interpretation), so 
that it can be found verstehen as in hermenetic studies. The Marxian 
group considers that narrative history is considered not to explain 
the problem of superstructure which is considered to be the domain 
of positivistic history (Williams, 1980: 31-32). For positivistic groups, 
the results of the study will be irrational, when not accompanied by 
the depth of knowledge (knowing) and understanding 
(understanding) of what is being done measurably and observable 
(Hughes, 1964; 50-51). 
 Munslow admitted that narrative in history would not be 
easy without a set of methodologies. A challenge for how historical 
researchers use methodologies that are often confronted with 
problems of subjectivity and objectivity. This was the case in the 
narration, Munslow acknowledged that it was highly unlikely that 
subjective elements could escape narrative history. Munslow 
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seemed to answer related to the problem posed by Weberian and 
Marxian groups, namely that the problem of objectivity in narrative 
history lies in how the story has relations with narrative and 
narrating. Thus history is a way of explaining the relationship 
between story, narrating and narrative, based on empirical reality 
which is believed to be true. To explain this, Munslow distinguishes 
narrative and description. 
 
BIAS ON HISTORICAL DESCRIPTION, INTERPRETATION 
AND EXPLANATION 
 In 1824, Leopord von Ranke when he was not yet 30 years 
old, surprised European historians with his statement that history 
as a past decision must be placed on "what had really happened" 
(Geyl, 1966). The argument put forward by Ranke leads more to 
ways to separate myths and actual events. The past for Ranke is that 
all forms of events are always limited by certain spatial and 
temporal ones which have objective truth authority without any 
subordination and defection of swerving. A few years later after 
Ranke died, a British critics, Lord Acton, claimed that Ranke's 
thinking was considered a pioneer of critical historians with a new 
approach. According to Acton, Ranke's critical thinking lay in the 
way he rejected the Romanticism genre which was very popular at 
the end of the nineteenth century in Europe (Geyl, 1966; 12). This 
romanticism for Ranke too saw history as a meaningful of 
mythologies, "ideas of Gods". Even though history is a humanist 
construction that is seen more with an anthropocentric point of 
view, humans are historical actors. 
 Although McCullagh did not directly experience a debate 
with Ranke and Acton, if read carefully, it appears that McCullagh 
tried to get out of Ranke and Acton's thinking and tried to package 
it without leaving a Romanticism legacy. History was then more 
observable and had scientific procedures, although history still 
admitted that it could not be separated from personal and cultural 
judgment. McCullagh's article "Bias in Historical Description, 
Interpretation and Explanation" is a little skeptical to see historical 
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construction. According to him, as accurate as any data shown by 
historians, always has a subjective dimension involved since 
historians began to select topics and sources. There are two biases 
that haunt historians, namely personal and cultural biases. Personal 
bias is more due to the personal interests involved since verification. 
This personal bias for McCullagh has a structured complexity in the 
form of a backward and forward history of the historian. History as 
a critical construction result, for McCullagh, has a way to re-
examine the various questions about the past and the present. 
Therefore history functions to analyze causality which emphasizes 
inter-individual action relations, structures that form and 
individuals who have the significance of cultural change in two 
dimensions at once, flexibility and current (Burke, 1992). That is why 
personal and cultural bias is a big problem in reconstructing history 
and is often referred to as a matter of subjectivity, although it is very 
difficult to deny it. 
 History as a humanities discipline should place subjectivity 
in order to test objectivity. The only discipline that combines two 
dimensions directly, namely the subject and object, is critically 
history. For adherents of MacCullagh's thought, the empirical world 
as an objective world is very cultural and very attached to 
individual ideas and values (ideas and values). McCullagh still 
holds that the empirical world depends on how the subject 
understands it (verstehen). The historical object does not appear by 
itself, it must be described, narrated, and explained. Therefore, 
rationality is one of the doors to open ideas and values in objects. 
The problem is whether rationality is value free? Is not, according to 
McCullagh, precisely on the grounds of rationality, historians go 
further that they cannot be unaffected by their personal decisions, is 
not the historian in the selection process trapped in the problem of 
"willed events" and "truth" (historical truth) (Abdullah, 2001; 212-
248)? This view is in sharp contrast to what Ranke said. Ranke 
refused personal intervention in reconstructing history, even 
though in reality it was very unlikely that historians could be free 
from personal and cultural ties (culture of culture). 
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 Cultural bias according to McCullagh gives more flexibility 
to interpret the cultural scope that binds historians. But the cultural 
interpretation of a historical event actually delivers it in a complex 
inter-subjectivity to disentangle (Cultural Relativity). This is what 
McCullagh has a cultural bias that is very burdensome in 
determining objectivity. This cultural bias can cause informative 
errors, interpretive errors, and constructive errors. These errors will 
be very fatal in determining the meaning of a historical resource, 
historical events, and historical facts (historical facts). Further errors 
caused by cultural bias will lead to explanation errors and 
generalizations. Therefore, it is not surprising that later in the 
historical reconstruction, Indonesian historiography was presented 
with many historical writings which were not immune from fatal 
cultural biases, so that generalizations became unavoidable 
consequences. National History, for example, is a fundamental 
conceptual problem when the definition of "National" is interpreted 
as "Nusantara" or "Indonesia". National leads to an ideological 
concept that emphasizes the ideas of nationalism and citizenship. 
The history of the archipelago or Indonesia is more directed at the 
process of forming geo-politics given the name Nusantara or 
Indonesia. In practice the form of National History writing, 
Indonesian History makes no difference. Likewise the concept of the 
"Old Order", "New Order", for example is a generalization of 
historical periods that are ahistorical and more political in nature. 
Why not call the Soekarno period, the Suharto Period? Here 
McCullagh's writings are very useful to look back on the myths that 
are still inherent in Indonesian historiography. 
 The use of concepts, although trapped in subjectivity, is 
often used by historians to explain events. Understanding concepts 
without detailed description of events will not be able to use 
concepts in explaining events. The concepts in historical 
explanations must be placed in sequence times (descriptions, 
sequences and conseqeuences) (Kuntowijoyo, 2008). This does not 
mean that history is "contesting the concept" or "essentially 
concepted". History is not a row of concepts, history is not what 
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Weber thought of as an "ideal type". History deals with the idea of 
the age (zeitgist), something that moves, changes, overlaps and 
sometimes is wild. McCullagh rejects evolutionary analysis, because 
the evolutionist school takes too much time to understand the 
conjuncture of change over a long period of time and obscures its 
synchronous aspects. Although in some respects, McCullagh tends 
to display a skeptical methodology. Scepticism is an overly 
subjective-deterministic flow towards the possibility of objective 
possibility. It seems that McCullagh dissolved in Collingwood's 
idealism where historical issues were a matter of dialectic ideas with 
objects. Empirical analysis for McCullagh is an analysis of causal 
problems at the situational level using interpretative methods. This 
is intended as a way of explaining history that is not enough just to 
be explained empirically and qualitatively but requires interpretive 
choices. 
 According to McCullagh, historians cannot avoid personal 
or cultural bias. The standard of rationality in history does not mean 
rejecting biases, but how historians in carrying out reconstruction 
must avoid presuppositions which will result in the way of 
conceptualization. Conceptualization will create narrative errors. 
McCullagh in this case provides a way to avoid personal and 
cultural biases, namely the use of descriptive historical 
explanations. Descriptive explanation, it is safer to use to reduce 
conceptual errors and generalizations (a detailed descriptive 
explanation for avoiding preconception of historical subject 
fallacies). The historians' carefulness in describing an event will 
reduce the inter-subjective and personal problems a little more. 
Descriptive explanation, putting events on unique processes that are 
individualized to a general, generalizing, conceptualizing point of 
view. Uniqueness in historical studies can be used to see the 
occurrence of an event. This is where personal and cultural biases 
are tested through inter-subject relations, depth of explanation and 
completeness of data (Kuntowijoyo, 1995). As an illustration, when 
an event A occurs, then A is not the only cause for itself, there must 
be interjections in the form of a, b, c to z which provide backward 
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and forward as well as other causes, so the event A occurs and only 
occurs in accordance with destiny A, not another A, although there 
are many interjections that are very likely to affect (a, b, c etc.) 
(Ankersmit, 1987; 222-223). In this way, descriptive history is not 
easier in the construction process. In this way, what is considered 
objective truth is descriptive truth. Descriptive truth is also not as a 
claim of perfect objective truth, because in the process of 
description, historians often accidentally or intentionally, have 
created concepts, languages, beliefs, attitudes and even their culture 
summarized in their historical writings. That shows how difficult it 
is to separate subjectivity and objectivity in reconstructing history. 
 If so, the multidimensional approach that had been offered 
by Sartono Kartodirdjo became a complicated problem if it was not 
said to be a mission which was almost impossible. This is because 
the multidimensional approach is only at the level of 
conceptualization and generalization. History, by following the way 
of thinking McCullagh did not stop at the issue of conceptualization 
and generalization, in which there was a construction of what 
McCullagh referred to as "ideological intentions", "structural 
funions" and "social justice".  McCullagh offers the premises of the 
accuracy of this description through proof and proof which is then 
used to explain empirical reality. Descriptive evidence will provide 
boundaries of reality that are independent of assumptions 
(McCullagh, 1984). Through descriptive methods, at least, an 
explanation of the structure of history can be verified and explained. 
Thus, the study of history has its own logic that strengthens the 
analysis of objective truth and at the same time analyzes the 
subjective truth, a form of human knowledge. 
 
 
 
HISTORY AS AN IDEALISTIC CONSTRUCTION  
 History as a construction places the actual, representative 
and dynamic perspective of narrative history in the study. This is 
because that historical narrative is always created and explained by 
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its time (zeitgeist). Here historians are required to accumulate a 
variety of paradigmatic views and formulate them in language and 
perspective. Because basically history as a construction is a desired 
history (willed history). The logic of the historiography debate is a 
debate between the subjects of the originator of history, not a 
historical substantive debate anymore. For simplicity, if there are 
questions, is the 1965 case is historical event, then the answer, yes, 
that event is history. But if the view of constructionism is put 
forward, then if there is a question whether the "events of 1965" are 
history?, the answer is "yes", but when it continues with the question 
of how the history of "the events of 1965", the answers vary and tend 
to be missed. Using the term Ronald H. Nash, often such historical 
debates tend to be speculative. (Nash: 1969). In that sense, the truth 
of history is subjective truth, but it is not a problem, because there 
are still rooms to be criticized and given new meanings, rather than 
standardized history, a history of being attached. 
 In connection with the manner of the above views, it is 
interesting especially to place historical writers in unlimited spatial 
and temporal spaces. The freedom to choose and interpret historical 
events is a rights, the accountability is in the "humanitarian" realm, 
not even in the realm of the state or even academic institutions. Is 
history humanity or not, the indicator is not how great historians 
concoct data into a historical narrative, but how far the meanings of 
historical narrative can be understood, and interpreted as a way of 
humanizing humans. For these "schools of thought", factual detail 
matters are only matters of greatness finding and interpreting 
historical sources. The logic of the narrative does not stop there 
enough, history must be able to provide an answer to what history 
was written? That is why history was later used, history was "not 
historical", it was written down, history turned into a tool and even 
history became a commodity, history has been distorted, that is, 
history that is not reachable by narrative and descriptive reasoning. 
To avoid the entrapment of mythology, historians who are members 
of academic historians need to "reconstruct" history with various 
positivistic standards and matrices. The construction began to 
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change from speculative to critical thinking. In this space, history is 
nothing but a method for factual justification that is claimed as 
historical truth. Again, history as a construction does not escape the 
intervention of the subject. Whether the subject is a guide to the 
narrative or the subject as a narrative sacrifice is not important. 
Because the purpose of the positivistic school is, that fact can only 
be read and understood not to be articulated in logical, rational and 
human actions. 
 In the study of history as a humanities, history actually 
wants to be returned as a way to find its human identity. Such 
history is history that removes all forms of distortion and 
hegemony. History is allowed to speak its own language. This 
proposal seems interesting and will find "historical justice", but 
what is forgotten is that history will reconstruct itself in various 
uncontrolled perspectives. So that the truth of history becomes 
blurred, not transparent and only lives in discourse. If this is true 
then the 1965 events historiography, for example, will always be 
present in the form of a new myth, and this, in Burke's terms, will 
be more cruel and create endless symbolic violence, both for 
historical observers, historians, historical actors and even those who 
know nothing about history (Burke: 1992). "Symbolic violence" in 
the sense of Burke is a form of new hegemonic culture (academic 
institution, State) which causes the emergence of resistance by silent 
means. This can be seen again how discourse and public discussions 
related to the issue of the events of 1965 were a serious threat to the 
State including all symbols created, as well as language. 
 
 
HISTORY FOR HUMANITIES?  
 When history no longer occupies a space of justice and 
always reproduces new myths, both in academic and non-academic 
studies, of course historical reconstruction is one way for history to 
be more human and defend humanity (history as philosophy). A 
hope that is tendentious and almost impossible. This is because 
history is not an event as it is, history is "beyond the evidence". So 
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that historical truth is a subjective truth about the omnipotence 
present in the present. This is what historians need for collective 
memory as a "rival" to reduce the nature of subjectivity. Moreover, 
coupled with positivistic hegemony which only wallows in "social 
matrices" that are rigid and arrogant, using the author's quote "no 
document, no history", is a new trap in reconstructing history. Here, 
narrative notes as philosophical thought provide fresh air, that 
history is a totality both tangible and intangible. Very inhumane and 
injustice if history as a construction negates other constructions that 
are considered ahistorical and mythological. History as totality does 
not have consequences. Such history will give birth to new 
speculations (McCullagh: 1984). For adherents of this school, 
speculative views are safer and more human than history which 
"kills" other histories. 
 Some of the basic theories put forward by Kaplan and 
Manners show how the relativism to objectivism debate became a 
crucial issue in the study of the history. It relates to how theories are 
built, defined, compared to the emergence of religious types of 
theories based on the typology of objects and their paradigms. 
Theories are often affixed to cultural processes, which later become 
cultural theories, certainly give a different view if it is transformed 
into a cultural theory which means also talking about the processes 
of cultural dynamics (Barker, 2000). However, cultural theory has 
become interesting because culture is interpreted as a matter of 
heuristics, linguistics, evolution, adaptation, conflict, relations, to 
cognitive and ideological issues. Cultural theory may only be 
fixated on the problem of artifacts, something that has been made 
that does not show the process, relevance and adaptation, and 
causality. Objectivity then becomes a bet in studying various 
cultural issues including history. Therefore cultural theory is 
broader than just cultural theory. If in anthropological studies the 
theory is used   to capture unique, antique and exotic mosaics, 
historical narratives are not very different nor seek uniqueness not 
only in the types of artifacts and the superiority of a fact, but history 
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with its narrative will be wider when history moves not only at the 
synchronic level but also diachronic. 
 Descriptive explanations and empirical generalizations 
form the basis of social science research, which is often claimed as a 
generalist group. Sharp criticizes the generalist group that 
descriptive studies and empirical generalizations are not able to 
reveal synchronous aspects in which there are important constructs 
of meaning (Barker, 2000; Bee, 1974). Descriptive explanations and 
empirical generalizations are only at the diachronic level which is 
only able to capture the external aspects. Therefore, descriptive 
explanations and empirical generalizations must be supplemented 
by theoretical generalizations whose ends are philosophy. The use 
of philosophy in the study of history is not only used to bridge the 
diachronic and synchronous aspects, but is a way to make the study 
"readable" in understanding patterns, construction of the 
concatenated theory with its structural details (Kaplan and 
Manners, 1999, pp. 21). 
 With descriptive-narrative explanation, the historical 
explanation becomes humanist and empirical. Important studies 
such as Wittfogel's Oriental Despotics, Steward's Patrilineal 
concept, Sahlins's theory of expansionism, Wallace's and Woresley's 
revitalization patterns are very important in historical explanations 
(Kaplan and Manners, pp. 26). Philosophy as a historical method 
does not always make history study without flaws. Critics assume 
that philosophy in historical narratives is often used only to pattern 
a diachronic process. Therefore, such policing has a tendency that 
the historical process is too mixed with speculative issues and will 
lead to the emergence of quasi theory (quasi theory). This is because 
the truth of history becomes speculative and the theory built is 
presumably a form of policing based on recognition and subjective 
justification. Therefore the narrative that has been understood and 
accepted is not derived from empirical scientific facts. These facts 
are only part of the procedure for making policing, so the factual 
relations themselves that actually become scientific order become 
unclear. By Steward, this is called the "Causal Causality of Law" 
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(Kaplan and Manners, 1999, pp. 28). The most crucial issue of the 
narrative is the spacing between the time of research and the time 
when the researcher makes a theory. Conventional historians often 
get caught up in the trap of time and place, so historical 
anachronisms are precisely the result of their studies. The 
deductive-inductive model is their argument for describing the 
symptoms and trends of historical processes. The totality then only 
exists in concatenated theory, not at the diachronic and synchronous 
narrative level. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 Narrative is a way of thinking about the repetition of 
arguments within the boundaries of space and time. The argument 
that is built always cannot be separated from what is believed to be 
true by academic evidence. However, the involvement of subjective 
reasoning must be recognized which is precisely an indicator of how 
the historical narrative is explained. By paying attention to the 
narrative as a philosophical method, it is very possible in historical 
explanations to find various problems and debates about "historical 
truth". Following the explanation above, actually "historical truth" 
is a "subjective truth" which must be accounted for "objective truth". 
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